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Miller v. California Revisited: An Empirical 
Note 
Robert E. Riggs* 
In his celebrated dissent from the majority in Paris Addt  
Theatre I v. Slaton,' Justice Brennan concluded that obscenity 
could never be defined with sufficient precision to establish a 
workable constitutional standard. He observed that experience 
with the Roth casea 
has certainly taught us that the outright suppression of obscen- 
ity cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principles of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
. . . .  
[N]o one definition, no matter how precisely or narrowly 
drawn, can possibly suffice for all situations, or carve out fully 
supressible expression from all media without also creating a 
substantial risk of encroachment upon the guarantees of the 
Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.8 
He therefore urged that the first amendment guarantees of free 
speech be interpreted to "prohibit the State and Federal Gov- 
ernments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented 
materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents,'' at 
least "in the 'absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive ex- 
posure to unconsenting ad~lta."~ Since Justice Brennan had au- 
thored the Court's opinion in Roth, the Paris dissent was an ac- 
knowledgment of a fundamental change in his own position 
* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.A., 
M.A., 1952, University of Arizona; Ph.D., 1955, University of Illinois; LL.B., 1963, Uni- 
versity of Arizona. 
1. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Paris upheld a court order under Georgia civil law enjoining 
the exhibition of two sexually explicit films in two Atlanta, Georgia, "adult" theaters. 
There was no issue of prior restraint. 
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), decided in the same opinion with 
companion case, Alberts v. California. 
3. 413 U.S. at  83, 85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
4. Id. a t  113. 
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during the intervening years. 
Justice Brennan's easy identification of Roth v. United 
States with "suppression of obscenity" is a nice irony in the per- 
spective of history. Roth, to be sure, had upheld a federal con- 
viction for transmitting obscene materials through the mails. 
But in the process, the Court adopted a definition of obscenity 
far less restrictive than the test then being applied in many 
jurisdictions throughout the country. Prior to the 1957 Roth de- 
cision, United States obscenity law had leaned heavily upon the 
1868 English case of Regina v. Hicklin.' In that case Lord 
Cockburn delineated the test of obscenity as being "whether the 
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and 
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, 
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."@ The 
effect of this test was to tie the definition of obscenity to the 
assumed susceptibilities of the most vulnerable members of the 
potential audience. Although the material might have no "cor- 
rupting" influence on persons of great moral rectitude, or even 
on the average person, it could still be "obscene" if the court 
was convinced that it might corrupt weaker persons whose 
minds were "open to such immoral influences." Furthermore, 
isolated passages could be used to condemn the whole work.' 
Notwithstanding the fact that a number of state and lower 
federal court decisions had made serious inroads upon the Hick- 
lin formula by the mid 1950s, Hicklin remained the law in many 
 jurisdiction^.^ Only after Roth was it clear that the Hicklin test 
5. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). 
6. Id. a t  371. 
7. In the United States the Hicklin test was used to ban Theodore Dreiser's An 
American Tragedy (1930), Lillian Smith's Strange Fruit (1945), and Erskine Caldwell's 
God's Little Acre (1950). See Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 
(1930); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543,62 N.E.2d 840 (1945); Attomey Gen- 
eral v. Book Named "God's Little Acre", 326 Mass. 281,93 N.E.2d 819 (1950); L. SOBEL, 
PORNOGRAPHY, OBSCENITY & THE LAW 8 (1979). 
The Hicklin rule did suffer substantial erosion, however, in the last two or three 
decades before Roth. See, e.g., Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940); 
United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); ACLU v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 
334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954); Attorney General v. Book Named "Forever Amber", 323 
Mass. 302, 81 N.E.2d 663 (1948); People v. Berg, 241 A.D. 543, 272 N.Y.S. 586 (1934), 
aff'd, 269 N.Y. 514,199 N.E. 513 (1935); People v. Viking Press, Inc., 147 Misc. 813,264 
N.Y.S. 534 (Magis. Ct. 1933); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 P a  D. & C. 101 (1949). 
8. Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), 
had suggested by way of dictum that the "average conscience" would be a better measure 
than the conscience of the most susceptible. Twenty years later a federal district judge 
abandoned Hicklin and applied Hand's dictum to find that James Joyce's Ulysses, taken 
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would not meet the requirements of the first amendment. The 
effect of Roth, therefore, far from spearheading a new movement 
for the suppression of obscenity, was to open the legal floodgates 
to a great wave of sexually oriented expression. Roth replaced 
the standard of the most susceptible members of a potential 
audience with the standard of the "average person, applying 
contemporary community standards.''@ Furthermore, isolated 
passages would no longer suffice: "the dominant theme of the 
material taken as a whole" must "appeal to the prurient inter- 
est."1° Roth was part of the burgeoning judicial trend to enlarge 
first amendment guarantees in all areas. Its impact was not to 
suppress but to stimulate the production and distribution of 
sexually oriented material. 
Justice Brennan was right in at least one respect, however. 
Experience from Roth to Paris had raised doubts concerning the 
feasibility of the definitional approach to obscenity control. A 
bare majority of five justices had agreed on Roth's new and more 
liberal definition of obscenity.ll Within a decade, however, this 
limited consensus had disintegrated.la By 1967 at least four dif- 
ferent views of obscenity had emerged, none commanding a ma- 
jority. Totally bereft of doctrinal unity, the Court initiated a 
practice of per curiam reversals of obscenity convictions when 
as a whole, was not obscene. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 5 I?. Supp. 
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). Thereafter some state and federal 
court decisions adopted a more permissive rule while others retained the Hicklin stan- 
dard. See cases cited at note 6 supra. A few months before Roth, the Supreme Court had 
rejected the "most susceptible persons" element of the Hicklin test by finding unconsti- 
tutional a Michigan statute prohibiting sale to adults of materials tending to corrupt 
minors. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In Roth the Hicklin approach was re- 
jected outright. 
9. 354 U.S. at 489. 
10. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
11. Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result without endorsing the reasoning. 
Id., at 494 (concurring opinion). Justice Harlan believed the reviewing court must make 
an independent judgment upon the materials in each case rather than propounding a 
generalized definition to be applied by the trier of fact. He also argued that states should 
have much greater latitude than the federal government to regulate obscenity. Id. at 496 
(separate opinion). Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, contended that obscenity is 
a form of expression fully protected by the first amendment. Id. at  508 (dissenting 
opinion). 
12. In addition to Roth, see opinions expressed in A Book Named "John Cleland's 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Memoirs v. Massachusetts]; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 
(1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 
378 US. 205 (1964). The differing views are elucidated by Justice Brennan in his Paris 
dissent, 413 U.S. at 80-82. 
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any five or more justices, applying their separate definitions, 
could agree that the materials in question were not obscene.la 
This approach was not calculated to provide much guidance to 
lower courts, nor even much consistency in Supreme Court 
decisions. 
No one regarded this doctrinal anarchy as a satisfactory 
state of affairs, and it was ultimately terminated by Miller u. 
California,14 a companion case to Paris. Sustaining a conviction 
for knowingly distributing obscene matter in violation of Califor- 
nia law, a bare majority of the Court once more agreed on a new 
definitional test of obscenity. Chief Justice Burger, author of the 
opinion, set forth the following "basic guidelines for the trier of 
fact": 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com- 
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work de- 
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit- 
ical, or scientific value.lb 
The Court repeated and emphasized the point that regulation 
should be limited to "works which depict or describe sexual con- 
duct" and then only if the conduct was "specifically defined by 
the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively con- 
strued."16 Past experience had convinced Justice Brennan that a 
definitional approach to the regulation of obscenity was not 
workable, at least not within the constraints of the first and 
fourteenth amendments. For five members of the Court, how- 
ever, the same experience pointed to the need for agreement on 
a more specific and concrete definition. 
Miller "sought to clarify the constitutional definition of ob- 
scene material subject to regulation by the States."17 Paris ex- 
plored and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the state interest in reg- 
ulating obscene conduct and expression, even when the conduct 
involves only consenting adults. The lengthy Brennan dissent in 
13. The practice was begun in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Some 31 
such cases from 1967 to 1973 are collected and cited in the Brennan dissent in Paris, 413 
U.S. at 82 n.8. 
14. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
15. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
16. Id. 
17. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 55. 
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Paris, however, provided an elaborate rationale for rejecting al- 
together the Roth-Miller-Paris definitional approach to the reg- 
ulation of obscenity. The arguments presented in the dissent re- 
main important today because they continue to represent the 
position of at least three members of the Court. Justices Bren- 
nan and Marshall participated in the dissent and have not since 
changed their position. Justice Stevens, who succeeded Justice 
Douglas,18 has regularly sided with the dissent when the Miller 
definition is at issue. He has made clear his position that crimi- 
nal prosecution is not suitable as "the mechanism for regulating 
the distribution of erotic material."la With such continuing sup- 
port on the Court, the rationale for changes urged by the present 
minority surely retains continuing importance. 
The purpose of this Article is to determine whether the 
Brennan argument, as set forth in the Paris dissent, remains 
persuasive in the light of developments since the Miller decision. 
To some extent the arguments for treating obscenity as pro- 
tected expression have their foundation in value preferences. 
The Brennan position is rooted in a strong preference for first 
amendment values over almost everything else. The Burger (ma- 
jority) position, while sensitive to first amendment concerns, 
shows greater deference to the judgment of state legislatures and 
is more willing to look for some suitable balancing of free ex- 
pression against other values of importance to society. 
Value preferences, however, provide only the foundation for 
the Paris dissent. The Brennan rationale, so carefully articu- 
lated in that opinion, also assumes that a particular, unverified, 
empirical state of affairs justifies the abandonment of obscenity 
suppression. As he states, it is the Court's "experience with the 
18. The late Justice Douglas, also a dissenter in Miller, had gone even farther in 
repeatedly &rming that obscenity was a form of expression fully protected by the first 
amendment. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650-71 (1968) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482-92 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissent- 
ing); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 424-41 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72-74 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
Smith v. California, 361 US. 147, 167-69 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
19. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 313 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 
also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 305 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring); Ward v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 781-82 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Splawn v. California, 431 
US. 595, 602 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As of this writing Justice 
Stewart's successor has not had occasion to participate in a Supreme Court decision on 
the question. 
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Roth approach" that convinced him of the irreconcilability of 
"outright suppression of obscenity" with the "fundamental prin- 
ciples of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."" This Article 
will not explore his value premises, even though they are not 
wholly shared; rather, it will examine the extent to which the 
empirical assumptions underlying the Brennan rationale are 
supported by actual developments. 
Justice Brennan's assumptions can be readily gleaned from 
the Paris dissent, and some of them are spelled out quite explic- 
itly. He does not label them "empirical assumptions." He dis- 
cusses them instead as "problems" arising from the b'vagueneas 
of the standards in the obscenity area."" Nevertheless, the exis- 
tence of a problem in each instance is premised on certain fac- 
tual assumptions which may or may not be accurate. The dis- 
tinction between "problems" and "assumptions" is not purely 
academic. A problem calls for a solution. Empirical assumptions, 
on the other hand, call for verification or disconfirmation. If the 
problem exists only in relationship to a particular set of factual 
assumptions, disproving the assumptions may suggest that there 
is no problem or that the problem is of different dimensions. 
The problems identified by Justice Brennan in Paris relate 
to ( 1 )  "the lack of fair notice," (2) "the chill on protected ex- 
pression," and (3) "stress imposed on the state and federal judi- 
cial machinery? Clearly implied are corresponding empirical 
assumptions that prospective defendants do not in fact have fair 
notice, that protected expression is chilled, and that judicial ma- 
chinery is subject to stress. 
With respect to the first problem, Justice Brennan argues 
that fair notice is precluded by the inherent vagueness of con- 
cepts used to define obscenity. The meaning of such terms as 
"prurient interest," "patent offensiveness," and "serious literary 
value" must necessarily vary "with experience, outlook, and even 
idiosyncrasies of the person defining them."as Book publishers 
and booksellers can thus never be sure when the materials they 
publish or purvey are likely to be deemed criminally obscene. 
20. 413 US. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 86. 
22. Id. at 93. 
23. Id. at 84. 
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Hence the lack of fair notice. 
The second problem arises from the same context. Because 
booksellers cannot be sure when they are crossing the line that 
separates the obscene from the nonobscene, they may refrain 
from publishing or selling material that would in fact be consti- 
tutionally protected. Hence the chill on protected expression. 
The third problem concerns "the institutional stress that in- 
evitably results where the line separating protected from unpro- 
tected speech is excessively vague?' One aspect of this "stress" 
is the sheer number of cases appealed to the Supreme Court and 
other courts of appellate jurisdiction. A second aspect of the in- 
stitutional problem is the personal predicament of judges who 
must peruse or view the material before passing judgment on its 
obscenity. Still another aspect is the "continuing source of ten- 
sion between state and federal courts" made inevitable by un- 
certain standards that require an independent determination by 
the Supreme Court and thus "render superfluous even the most 
conscientious analysis by state tribunals."a6 This tension is 
heightened by the Court's inability to justify its decisions "with 
a persuasive rationale-or indeed, any rationale at all-" which 
"necessarily creates the impression that [the Court is] merely 
second-guessing state court judges."a6 
24. Id. at 91. 
25. Id. at 93. 
26. Id. In his discussion of institutional stress, Justice Brennan also refers to the 
absence of "regularity in obscenity decisions by state and lower federal courts." Id. at 92. 
This might be treated as an additional aspect of institutional stress, but it appears rele- 
vant primarily as it contributes to the volume of cases on appeal and raises the frustra- 
tion level of state courts forced to act without adequate guidance. Justice Brennan's as- 
sumptions about the lack of fair notice, chill on protected speech, and, to a lesser extent, 
institutional stress have been widely echoed in legal literature. See, e.g., Davidow & 
O'Boyle, Obscenity Laws i n  England and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 
56 NEB. L. REV. 249 (1977); Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems i n  Obscenity Regula- 
tion: A Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment 
Preclusion, 7 SETON HALL . REV. 543 (1976); Fahringer & Cambria, The New Weapons 
Being Used in Waging War Against Pornography, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 553 (1978); Fried- 
man, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Thea- 
ters, 28 HASTINGS L. REV. 1293 (1977); Hunsaker, The 1973 Obscenity-Pornography De- 
cisions: Analysis, Impact, and Legislative Alternatives, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REX. 906 
(1974); Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First 
Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533 (1975); Mott & Kellett, Obscenity, Community Stan- 
dards, and the Burger Court: From Deference to Dkrray ,  13 S ~ O L K  L. F W .  14 
(1979); Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography: The Case for An Exclusive Obscenity Nui- 
sance Statute, 44 U.  CHI. L. REV. 509 (1977); Teachout, Chains of Trrrdition, Instru- 
ments of Freedom: Contours of the Emerging Right to Community in Obscenity Law, 7 
CAP. U.L. REV. 683 (1978); Waples & White, Choice of Community Standards i n  Federal 
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If Justice Brennan had limited his critique to the historical 
period from Roth to Miller, his position would be easier to de- 
fend. However, he predicted that things would not be, indeed 
could not be, better after Miller. His assumptions about what 
had happened since Roth were projected unchanged upon the 
post-Miller world. 
[I]t is beyond dispute that the [Miller] approach can have no 
ameliorative impact on the cluster of problems that grow out of 
the vagueness of our current standards. Indeed, even the Court 
makes no argument that the reformulation will provide fairer 
notice to booksellers, theater owners, and the reading and 
viewing public. Nor does the Court contend that the approach 
will provide clearer guidance to law enforcement officials or re- 
duce the chill on protected expression. Nor, finally, does the 
Court suggest that the approach will mitigate to the slightest 
degree the institutional problems that have plagued this Court 
and the state and federal judiciary as a direct result of the un- 
certainty inherent in any definition of obs~enity.~' 
Nor was the applicability of Justice Brennan's assumptions lim- 
ited to the particular definitional formulation of Miller. They 
applied, apparently, to all possible judicial definitions of 
obscenity: 
Our experience since Roth requires us not only to abandon 
the effort to pick out obscene materials on a case-by-case basis, 
but also to reconsider a fundamental postulate of Roth: that 
there exists a definable class of sexually oriented expression 
that may be totally suppressed by the Federal and State Gov- 
ernments. Assuming that such a class of expression does in fact 
exist, I am forced to conclude that the concept of "obscenity" 
cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to pro- 
vide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually 
oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected 
speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected 
speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms.08 
As factual propositions, Justice Brennan's assumptions 
Obscenity Proceedings: The Role of the Constitution and the Common Law, 64 VA. L. 
REV. 399 (1978); Comment, Federal Obscenity Prosecutions: Dirty Dealing with the 
First Amendment?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 720 (1978); Note, Miller v. California: A 
Cold Shower for the First Amendment, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 568 (1974); Not., Postal 
Obscenity Rosecutions After Miller v. California: Mandatory Venue in the Federal Dis- 
trict of Intended Receipt, 58 B.U.L. REV. 39 (1978). 
27. 413 U.S. at 98 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
28. Id. at 103 (footnote omitted). 
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about lack of fair notice, the chill on protected expression, and 
institutional stress present serious difficulties of analysis. In any 
empirical study, concepts must be "operationally" defined, that 
is, "defined in terms of, or with reference to, specific kinds of 
data that are available and can be meas~red."~~ The first as- 
sumption, that the Miller definition does not provide potential 
defendants fair notice of what materials may be deemed crimi- 
nally obscene, is especially difficult to define operationally in 
any useful way. The empirical fact is a subjective one, i.e., how 
the bookseller perceives the legal rule in relation to his own bus- 
iness activities. With such a troublesome focus, the difficulty of 
obtaining reliable data is virtually insurmountable. Data could, 
of course, be generated by surveying a sample of defendants in 
obscenity prosecutions, but the cost-benefit ratio of such a pro- 
ject would be less than favorable. Even if an appropriate sample 
could be identified and an adequate response obtained, few de- 
fendants could be objective about their own attitudes toward a 
legal rule under which they had been prosecuted and, in many 
cases, convicted. In the absence of reliable data, the validity of 
Justice Brennan's assumption about fair notice must be chal- 
lenged in the same manner as he defends it-through use of 
logic and analogy rather than systematic empirical data. 
Proving or disproving the "chill" on protected expression is 
beset with many of the same difficulties. A satisfactory test 
would first require an examination of material the potential pur- 
veyor would have published had he not felt the chill and then a 
determination of whether, if the material had been published, it 
would have been constitutionally protected. Merely stating the 
test is enough to demonstrate its unfeasibility. Absent such data, 
this assumption will be evaluated by reference to national trends 
in the volume and explicitness of erotic materials since the 
Miller decision. 
The third assumption, relating to stress imposed on the ju- 
dicial machinery, can be adequately defined in some of its as- 
pects by reference to the decided cases. Exploration of this as- 
sumption will represent the principal empirical contribution of 
this Article. 
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A. Vagueness and Fair Notice 
Is the rule of Miller too vague to provide fair notice? The 
answer depends on what is meant by fair notice. In the Paris 
dissent Justice Brennan quoted with obvious approval the ma- 
jority opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren in United 
States v. Harri~s:~O 
[Tlhe constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by 
a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelli- 
gence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by 
the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be 
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not rea- 
sonably understand to be proscribed.81 
The United States v. Harriss formulation is specifically ad- 
dressed to statutory vagueness, and in that respect the Miller 
decision clearly opts for a stricter standard of notice by insisting 
that the proscribed conduct "be specifically defined by the ap- 
plicable state law."- Justice Brennan applies this same standard 
to constitutional interpretation as well, however, and we will fol- 
low his lead. 
If the notice requirement means that a bookseller must 
know with certainty that contemplated conduct is (or is not) for- 
bidden, then Mr. Brennan is right in stating that there would 
not be fair notice in many obscenity cases. But the Court has 
not characteristically demanded the "sure knowledge" kind of 
notice. In Nash v. United  state^,'^ a 1913 decision upholding 
criminal sanctions under the Sherman Act, Justice Holmes 
observed: 
[Tlhe law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his 
estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates 
it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only 
may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment, as here; he may 
incur the penalty of deathY 
Neither the decision nor the rationale of Nash has since been 
30. 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
31. 413 U.S. at 87 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (foot- 
note omitted)) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
32. 413 U.S. at 24. 
33. 229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
34. Id. at 377. 
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repudiated, and the case is still cited in opinions where the issue 
of vagueness is raised.36 
Moreover, the Court has gone far beyond holding that facial 
vagueness in a statute may be constitutionally tolerable. Even 
where the statute on its face is too vague to provide adequate 
notice, the Court has consistently held that the indefiniteness 
may be cured by authoritative state court interpretation. A typi- 
cal statement of this rule is found in Wainwright v. Stone:s6 
"For the purpose of determining whether a state statute is too 
vague and indefinite to constitute valid legislation, 'we must 
take the statute as though it read precisely as the highest court 
of the State has interpreted it.' "" Until the mid 1960s the cura- 
tive interpretation could even come after the fact through an ap- 
pellate court gloss on a statute under which the appellant had 
already been convicted in a trial court." This anomaly has now 
been removed from the law:@ but at  no time has the Court 
abandoned its position that state court interpretation may cure 
unconstitutional vagueness in a statute for the purpose of subse- 
quent prosecution. 
In cases decided by the Supreme Court there is no dissent 
from the proposition that some degree of uncertainty is constitu- 
tionally tolerable. United States v. Harriss set forth the stan- 
dard of fair notice upon which Justice Brennan relied in his 
Paris dissent. But even in that opinion, Chief Justice Warren 
35. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,439 (1978); 
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975); 
United States v. Harriss, 347 US. 612, 624 n.15 (1954). 
36. 414 U.S. 21 (1973). 
37. Id. at  22-23. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,201 (1976); Hynes v. Mayor 
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,622 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,573 (1974); Shuttles- 
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87,91-92 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
432 (1963); Paulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 
312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 273 
(1940). 
38. In '1960 a commentator noted that "the Supreme Court, in passing on these pe- 
nal statutes, has invariably allowed them the benefit of whatever clarifying gloss state 
courts may have added in the course of litigation of the very case at bar." Note, The 
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 73 (1960) 
(footnote omitted). This anomaly had been earlier noted by the Court itself. Speaking 
by way of dictum, Justice Reed observed, "We assume that the defendant, at  the time he 
acted, was chargeable with knowledge of the scope of subsequent interpretation." Win- 
ters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1948). 
39. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1965); Ashton v. 
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966). These cases indicate that a criminal conviction will 
no longer be sustained on the basis of a limiting interpretation of the statute occurring 
subsequent to the trial. 
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acknowledged that all uncertainty need not be eliminated. It was 
enough that "the general class of offenses to which the statute is 
directed is plainly within its terms." If that condition is met, 
"the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though mar- 
ginal cases could be put where doubts might arise."4o Indeed, 
terms such as "breach of peace," "disturbing the peace," and 
"disorderly conduct" are inherently incapable of defining with 
absolute certainty the specific kinds of conduct deemed criminal. 
Yet statutes utilizing such terms are not uniformly held to be 
unconstitutionally vague, and attempts to provide the requisite 
clarity through judicial construction are often much easier to un- 
derstand as case-by-case rationalizations after the fact than as 
fair notice to future defendants." 
Like obscenity statutes, breach of peace statutes often raise 
issues of first amendment rights-admittedly an area where 
"stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be 
applied" because of the "potentially inhibiting effect on 
speech.'"12 But obscenity prosecutions also suggest interesting 
parallels with antitrust cases where the more relaxed Nash ratio- 
nale has been applied. In both areas the potential defendant is 
likely to be a businessman attempting to promote a primarily 
business interest.4s Both need legal counsel in advance of pro- 
40. 347 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted). 
41. Compare, for example, Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), with Edwards 
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
Sunderland makes the same point in slightly different terms: 
[Justice Brennan's] argument simply establishes that judicial judgment is nec- 
essary to the application of obscenity statutes if their purpose is to be effected. 
Such judgment is characteristic of a body of law containing such terms as 
"breach of the peace," "negligence," and "due process of law." Although these 
terms are no more susceptible to precise and inclusive definition than is ob- 
scenity, the fact that they do not admit of a litmus paper test does not elimi- 
nate them from the cognizance of the law. 
L. SUNDERLAND, OBSCENITY: T m  COURT, THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 
23 (1974). 
42. In recent years the Court has emphasized that "stricter standards of permissible 
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on 
speech." Smith v. California, 361 US. 147, 151 (1959). See also Hynes v. Mayor of 
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76-82 (1976); Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973). 
43. The following excerpt from a story reported in a national Sunday supplement 
section may not be atypical: "I'm basically a businessman," observed a theater owner in 
response to queries about his X-rated movie house. "If I could show Walt Disney movies 
in Concord and make money at it, I'd do it. But it's been shown in the past that the 
theater can't be supported by that type of film . . . . If people didn't want these types of 
films, they wouldn't pay to see them." Frank, The Problem of Pornography in Cities 
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jected action to avoid pitfalls on an uncertain legal terrain." 
The object is profit, and both may be willing to run the risk of 
prosecution, or even conviction, if the risk is slight or the re- 
wards great enough." The publisher of sexually oriented materi- 
als has no more uncertainty about his options than the potential 
antitrust violator. Few will argue that even the most experienced 
antitrust lawyer can advise his client with certainty (1) that 
prosecution will or will not follow from a given action and (2) 
that such a prosecution will or will not be successful. Risks can 
be estimated, but the issue of illegality in borderline cases re- 
mains for the judicial process to resolve. 
The point of this argument is simple: the constitutional re- 
quirement of fair notice has been held to be satisfied in areas of 
criminal law no less vague than the field of obscenity. Speaking 
for the Court in Miller, Chief Justice Burger expressed his con- 
Large and Small, Family Weekly, Jan. 28, 1979, at 6. 
Compare this with the comment of a businessman indicted for price fixing in 1975, 
as reported in BUSINESS WEEK, June 2, 1975, at 48: "When you're doing $30 million a 
year and stand to gain $3 million by fixing prices, a $30,000 fine doesn't mean much. 
Face it, most of us would be willing to spend 30 days in jail to make a few extra million 
dollars." See also Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An 
Economic Analysis, 86 Hmv. L. REV. 693 (1973); Kadish, Some Observations on the Use 
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U .  CHI. L. REV. 423 
(1963). 
44. "[Tlhe generality of the language of the Sherman Act often makes it very diffi- 
cult for an honest businessman to determine whether particular business conduct vio- 
lates the law. Recognizing this problem of vagueness, criminal enforcement actions are 
usually brought only against 'hardcore' activities such as 'price fixing' or 'predatory prac- 
tices.' " M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TRADE REGULATION 155 (1975) (footnote omitted). In this context, the reference to 
"hardcore" activities seems especially apt. 
45. The concept of the commercial sex-exploiter as businessperson, consciously 
pressing toward the outer edge of the legally permissible, is illustrated in a feature article 
about a successful Atlanta criminal lawyer, appearing in the National Law Journal, Aug. 
6, 1979, at 13. The story is best told in the words of the writer: 
Mr. Zell's colorful career in defense of pornography took off in 1974 in a 
now-celebrated "Masturbation-for-hire" operation. 
A local entrepreneur approached Mr. Zell and he wanted to open an estab- 
lishment that could legally offer some sort of sexual service. He wanted to 
know what was legal. 
"I researched the law and told him he couldn't offer oral sex, intercourse 
or anything with animals, but there was nothing in the law about 
masturbation." 
So the city's first "Bath House," a name Mr. Zell chose because it sounded 
innocuous, opened to offer masturbation massages by a female "attendant." 
Even though the service cost $25, there were soon long lines of customers. 
Criminal charges brought under existing laws were dismissed, and, according to the re- 
port, "the bath house continued to enrich its owners until the city hurriedly passed a 
specific ordinance to outlaw that type of practice." 
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viction that the decision would "provide fair notice to a dealer in 
such materials that his public and commercial activities may 
bring prose~ution."~~ He did not say that such notice would 
mean full predictability, but the law does not require that. He 
was attirming that business people dealing in such wares would 
not be without notice of the risks they are taking. Given the na- 
ture of the business, this does not seem an unreasonable as- 
sumption. Unless the test demands absolute certainty of predic- 
tion, they have "fair notice." 
& 
B. The Chill on Protected Speech 
If the rewards of risk taking are great enough, publishers 
may press hard against the bounds of the permissible, and even 
beyond. Of this the wares in many an adult book store bear 
graphic witness. Still, some publishers and sellers may interpret 
restraints on the conservative side and refrain from purveying 
erotic materials that would in fact pass constitutional muster if 
put to the test. As previously noted, however, the assumption 
that constitutionally permissible material goes unpublished for 
this reason is hard to prove or disprove empirically. Material 
that is not published will never be subjected to a judicial test of 
its prurience, offensiveness, and social value. But even if the 
Miller rule encouraged some publishers to guess conservatively, 
it is hard to see that society is the worse for having access to a 
little less pornography of a type that falls just short of constitu- 
tionally defined hard core. 
The salient fact, of course, is that the quantity and explicit- 
ness of sexually oriented materials has continued to increase 
since the Miller decision. While no reliable statistics are availa- 
ble, the evidences of volume and explicitness are all around us. 
In 1976, Time magazine averred that "porn has mushroomed in 
the past decade, from a marginal underground cottage industry 
to an open, aggressive, $2 billion-a-year crime-ridden enter- 
pri~e."~VVithout giving specific figures, a recent analysis of ob- 
scenity in the United States concluded that the "volume of por- 
nography consumed by Americans increased tremendously 
during the 1960s and on past the mid-1970s despite government 
and other efforts to control it."48 Sampson, in a technical report 
46. 413 U.S. at 27. 
47. TIME, April 5, 1976, at 58. 
48. L. SOBEL, supra note 7, at 39. 
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prepared in August 1970 for the President's Commission on Ob- 
scenity and Pornography, saw the 1960s witnessing 
a shift of such major proportions that the degree of explicitness 
at  the frontier in 1960 is now found in mass media widely dis- 
tributed to the general buying public. During this period, the 
most explicit materials available on the market became more 
and more graphic. By August 1970, the most explicit materials 
available "above the counter" were approximately equivalent 
to the most explicit materials ever produced for covert sale.4s 
This observation was pre-Miller, but there is no evidence that 
the trend has changed much since then. The point is well made 
in the conclusion of the 1977 report of the New York University 
Law School's Obscenity Law Project, eloquent in the simplicity 
of its understatement: "The quantity and explicitness of materi- 
als apparently available nationwide . . . tend to belie assertions 
that obscenity regulation chills constitutionally protected 
speech. 
The N.Y.U. Obscenity Law Project requires further exami- 
nation here because its purpose was "to evaluate Miller's impact 
on the prosecution, control, production, distribution, and sale of 
sexually explicit material."61 Its findings are clearly relevant to 
determining the "chilling" impact of Miller. 
The empirical portions of the N.Y.U. study are based on 542 
questionnaire responses from city, county, and United States 
prosecutors throughout the country and some 97 interviews with 
"persons knowledgeable about obscenity law enforcement, con- 
ducted in 12 major cities."6a Summarized, the study found that 
(1) fewer responding jurisdictions were prosecuting obscenity 
cases after Miller (1974-75) than before (1971-72):s and (2) con- 
sidering all prosecutions in all responding jurisdictions, the total 
number of prosecutions had declined since Miller." With re- 
49. Sampson, Commercial Traffic in Sexually Oriented Materials in the United 
States (1969-1970), in 3 TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION  OBSCENI~ AND POR- 
NOGRAF'HY 207 (1970). 
50. Project, An Empirical Inquiry into the Effect of Miller v. California on the c&- 
trol of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 810, 930 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Obscenity Law 
Project). 
51. Id. at 859. 
52. Id. at 860. The latter group included prosecutors, defense attorneys, police offi- 
cials, persons in the entertainment industry, state legislators, and purveyors of sexually 
explicit materials. 
53. Id. at 866-67. 
54. Id. at 870. Although questionnaire data for 1976 prosecutions was not as com- 
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spect to the quantity of obscenity apparently available, 57.1 % of 
the responding prosecutors reported an increase in their juris- 
dictions during 1976 over 1971; only 22% detected a decrease.66 
The study concluded that "pornographic materials have grown 
more explicit in the years following Miller,"M and that Miller 
had exercised "little if any inhibiting effect on the content of 
sexually explicit materials.'"? 
One must admit that none of the published sources provides 
highly reliable indices of quantity and explicitness in sexually 
oriented materials since Miller. Even the impressive N.Y.U. Ob- 
scenity Law Project data consists only of people's opinions on 
the subject. But, such as it is, the evidence (supported by simple 
observation and awareness) all points in one direction: a nation- 
wide increase in both quantity and explicitness of sexually ori- 
ented material. If some individuals have felt the chill, the social 
impact of the chill has surely been de minimis? 
C. The Stress on Judicial Machinery 
If the case for fair notice is at least arguable, and if the so- 
cial impact of the chill seems negligible, what about the "institu- 
tional stress" on state and federal judicial machinery? Here the 
primary concerns raised by Justice Brennan are the sheer num- 
ber of cases coming to the appellate level, the predicament of 
plete as for earlier years, the responses showed a continuation of the trend toward fewer 
post-Miller prosecutions. Id. at 873-77. 
55. Id. at 887. 
56. Id. at 889 (footnote omitted). 
57. Id. at 890. These conclusions were based in part upon published sources but also 
on the Project's own extensive interviews. The post-Miller published comments in- 
cluded: (1) Arnold, We're Losing the Porno War, National Observer, Dec. 18, 1976, at 1, 
Col. 1; Slade, Recent Trends in Pornographic Films, SOCIETY, Septa-Oct. 1975, at  77; 
Smith, The Social Content of Pornography, 26 J. COM. 16, 19 (Winter 1976); N.Y. 
Times, June 23, 1973, at 1, col. 2; TIME, April 5, 1976, at 58-63; U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Jan. 13, 1975, at 31-33. For recent comments on volume and explicitness, all neces- 
sarily impressionistic rather than precise, see Frank, The Problem of Pornography in 
Cities Large and Small, Family Weekly, Jan. 28, 1979, at 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1979, 
3 B, at 10, col. 1; TIME, Aug. 27, 1979, at  64. 
58. One "west coast defense attorney," interviewed for the N.Y.U. project, alleged 
that some of "the more established producers of pornography left the business after 
Miller because of a perceived increase in the risk" and were "replaced by 'gypsy' produc- 
ers who operated on lower budgets and made films of lower quality." Another inter- 
viewee said that major motion picture producers "were about to begin production of 
hard core films featuring recognized actors and actresses" but cancelled those plans after 
Miller. Obscenity Law Project, supra note 50, at 889 n.376. If true, this could mean that 
Miller has resulted in less "high quality" hard core, which might be regarded by some as 
a negative social impact. 
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judges who must peruse the material, and the tension between 
state and federal courts resulting from uncertainty of standards. 
The "personal predicament" will not be addressed as a separate 
issue because, to a large extent, it is a function of the number of 
cases. The problem of judicial satiety at the appellate level is 
reduced in proportion to any decrease in the number of cases on 
appeal. This Article will, however, introduce empirical data 
bearing on the other two issues: the impact of Miller on the 
number of cases appealed and on the tension between state and 
federal courts. 
1. Miller's Impact on the Number of Cases Appealed 
Data relating to the number of cases appealed is presented 
in figures 1 and 2 and tables 1 and 2. The data base consists of 
state and federal appellate cases digested in the West Decennial 
Digests and the General Digest covering the years from 1947 to 
1978. The validity of the tables and corresponding graphs de- 
pends on the accuracy and completeness of the West digesting 
system, but risking a small margin of error on West's part is ob- 
viously preferable to undertaking an original analysis of all re- 
ported cases for the period. Table 1 and figure 1 deal only with 
cases digested under obscenity key number 5, entitled "Obscene 
Publications, Pictures, and Articles." Key number 5 was selected 
for primary analysis because, on inspection, it appeared to in- 
clude the issues most likely to be affected by the Miller decision. 
For that data the number of entries is identical with the number 
of actual cases appealed, except that a case appealed more than 
once is digested separately for each appellate level. Table 2 and 
figure 2 record the number of digested entries under all other 
obscenity key numbers. Because a given case may deal with 
more than one aspect of obscenity and hence be digested under 
two or more key numbers, the number of entries exceeds the 
number of cases by some undetermined amount. A laborious 
comparison of entries for every key number could have elimi- 
nated this discrepancy, but such a screening process was not felt 
necessary. It is reasonable to assume that the average number of 
digested entries per case will not vary significantly from year to 
year. Since trends rather than absolute numbers are the most 
important information to be drawn from the data, the trend line 
should look approximately the same whether digest entries or 
whole cases are used. This assumption is strengthened by obser- 
vation of the similarity in graph lines depicted in figures 1 and 2. 
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TABLE 1 
STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE CASES, 1974-1978, DIGESTED UNDER 
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TABLE 2 
STATE AND FEDERAL APPELLATE CASES, 1962-1978, DIGESTED UNDER ALL 
WEST OBSCENITY KEY NUMBERS, EXCEPT NUMBER 5 
Number 
Year of Cases - Year 
Number Number 
of Cases of Cases 
FIGURE 2 
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The table and corresponding figure present the same data. 
Of the two, the graph is the more interesting because it high- 
lights the trend and gives a better sense of relative proportions 
for different points on the curve. The tables simply provide de- 
tail for those who wish to examine the trend more closely. Look- 
ing at figure 1, the salient features of the curve are a uniformly 
small number of cases until the middle 1950s, a gradual if une- 
ven upswing in appealed cases for the next decade, a sharp up- 
trend beginning in 1969, and an almost equally sharp downturn 
since 1975. The moments of significant change in the trend line 
correspond in time with three landmark U.S. Supreme Court de- 
cisions on obscenity: Roth (1957), Memoirs v. Massachusetts 
(1966):@ and Miller (1973). Roth and Memoirs precede periods 
of increased output of appellate decisions; Miller comes at the 
beginning of a significant decrease. Although year to year fluctu- 
ations in the curve cannot be explained by these decisions, the 
general shape of the curve suggests some causal relationship. 
The inference is strengthened when lag time is taken into con- 
sideration. In each case the trend heralded by the decision does 
not appear until the second or third year following. Given the 
time-consuming nature of the appellate process, a lapse of two 
or three years before the effects of the decision become apparent 
is not unreasonable. 
This study was undertaken for the express purpose of test- 
ing the hypothesis that the volume of appealed cases would in- 
crease after Roth and Memoirs and decline after Miller. The lib- 
eralizing impact of Roth and the law of obscenity has been 
discussed above? Memoirs further expanded the scope of first 
amendment restrictions on the suppression of obscenity by in- 
sisting that no work, however offensive or prurient its appeal, 
could be found obscene if it possessed even a fragment of social 
value." In so holding, the Court overturned a determination by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that John Cleland's 
18th-century novel, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure or Fanny 
Hill, was obscene.0a Given this enlarged authority of appellate 
judges to overturn lower court convictions, an increased number 
of appeals was to be anticipated. 
59. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
60. See text accompanying notes 5-10 supra. 
61. 383 U.S. at 418-19. 
62. Attorney General v. A Book Named ''John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure", 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965). 
2471 MILLER v. CALIFORNIA 267 
Miller cut in the opposite direction. By moving from a na- 
tional community standard to a local community standard," and 
by requiring materials to pass a "serious value" t e ~ t , ~  the dis- 
cretion of appellate courts was limited and the range of unpro- 
tected materials was b r ~ a d e n e d . ~ ~  Logically, the result of such a 
doctrinal shift should have been fewer appeals and fewer rever- 
sals on appeal.66 The figures in tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that 
the absolute number of appellate cases has declined since Miller. 
Findings of the previously cited N.Y.U. survey indicate that the 
proportion of reversals on appeal also decreased, at least in the 
years immediately following Miller. Respondents reported 18 5% 
of pre-Miller (1971-72) convictions reversed on appeal but only 
8% reversal for the post-Miller period (1974-75):' The lowered 
likelihood of reversal in all probability contributed to fewer 
cases being appealed? 
The "landmark case" hypothesis, of course, does not explain 
all of the fluctuations in the curve. A slight upward trend may 
be perceived even before Roth; the peak year is 1974 rather than 
1973 when Miller was decided. The peaks and valleys shown 
63. 413 U.S. at 30-34 (1973). "Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a jury 
must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'national standards' when attempting to 
determine whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of fact." Id. at 31-32. The 
following year the Court held that the community standards need not be "statewide" 
either. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). In a companion case to Jenkins, the 
Court extended the local standards holding to a federal prosecution for mailing obscene 
material. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). 
64. The Miller formulation is "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 24. The Memoirs rule afforded 
protection unless the material was "utterly without redeeming social value." 383 U.S. at 
418. 
65. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 US. at 160 (1974), in reversing a state obscenity convic- 
tion for distributing the film "Carnal Knowledge," made clear that juries do not have 
"unbridled discretion" in determining what is obscene. 
66. In 1975 the author of a comment wrote: 
Miller's impact, although limited, is nonetheless important. The Miller rules 
effectively restructure the process through which, in particular cases, official 
answers are generated to the questions of what obscenity is and whether it 
ought to be suppressed. Appellate courts and legislatures no longer play para- 
mount roles. Instead, much of the locus of responsibility shifts to triers of fact. 
Comment, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. Cali- 
fornia, 88 HAW. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (1975). 
67. Obscenity Law Project, supra note 50, at 921. 
68. On the other hand, the Obscenity Law Project reported that the conviction rate 
in obscenity trials were identical for pre- and post-Miller prosecutions, i.e., 78% for both 
periods. Id. at 909. If the prospects for reversal decreased to some extent, the likelihood 
of conviction in the first place remained the same: And, as noted above, the number of 
prosecutions initiated by the sample group declined slightly after Miller. 
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during the 1960s must surely be related to other circumstances. 
This is not surprising. The number of appeals undoubtedly 
bears a relationship to the number of prosecutions, and the deci- 
sion to prosecute is affected by many influences other than the 
current Supreme Court definition of obscenity. As catalogued by 
the N.Y.U. Obscenity Law Project, such "influences" include 
community attitudes toward obscenity, "the vocalness of those 
offended by sexually explicit materials," prosecutor priorities, 
prosecutor resources, legislative activity, judge and jury atti- 
tudes, and political  pressure^.^^ Many of these variables are in- 
terrelated, but most would operate independently of the existing 
legal definition of obscenity. Influences such as these undoubt- 
edly account for many of the fluctuations in the trend line for 
appellate decisions. Indeed, given the number and variety of 
such forces, it is remarkable that the curve comports so well 
with the hypothesis. 
The landmark case hypothesis is consistent with observed 
facts and, on all the circumstances, remains highly plausible. 
But no causal relationship need be shown to challenge the valid- 
ity of Justice Brennan's empirical assumption about Miller. We 
may totally reject the hypothesis and assume instead that fewer 
appeals are the result of fewer prosecutions. Fewer prosecutions, 
in turn, may be a product of limited prosecutory resources and 
growing public tolerance of sexually explicit materials. Whatever 
the causal factors, the volume of appealed cases did not increase 
after Miller; it declined. If institutional stress is associated with 
a high volume of appeals, the stress is less since Miller. 
Table 2 and figure 2 require little additional comment. The 
data are presented to show that the overall shape of the curve is 
approximately the same for all entries as for key number 5 en- 
tries. Comment on possible causal relationships would be largely 
redundant of the preceding disc~ssion.~~ 
2. Miller's Impact on Tension Between State and Federal 
Courts 
The volume of decided appellate cases can be measured by 
a relatively straightforward count of index entries. The second 
aspect of institutional stress-tension between state and federal 
69. Id. at 891. 
70. A Lexis search on the word "obscenity" for the years 1947-79 produced more 
cases than those listed in Table 2 but a curve of similar shape to that shown in Figure 2. 
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courts-has qualitative aspects that are obviously more difficult 
to define in operational terms. The method chosen was to equate 
tension with judicial opinions expressing dissatisfaction with the 
state of obscenity law as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. If such a definition has validity, tension can be measured 
by counting the number of cases from a given sample in which 
such expressions of dissatisfaction appear. Defining "tension" in 
this fashion does not eliminate subjective judgment since some- 
one must still decide which cases express dissatisfaction and 
which do not. Some such judgment must be made in virtually 
every kind of content analysis, however, and any reader is free to 
read the cases cited and make his own determinati~n.~~ 
West's Digest was again the starting point for data collec- 
tion, with obscenity key number 5 providing access to judicial 
decisions most relevant to the search. The date of the Memoirs 
decision (1966) seemed a useful starting place, and 1978 was se- 
lected as a convenient cutoff point. The initial pool of cases thus 
included entries under obscenity key number 5 in the 8th De- 
cennial Digest (1966-76) and cases decided between 1976 and 
1978 appearing in the General Digest. From this population a 
random sample of 10% was drawn by selecting every tenth case, 
excluding decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The sample ulti- 
mately included thirty-two reported cases from the pre-Miller 
period7* and twenty-eight post-Miller de~isions.~~ 
71. An excellent, brief manual on the subject of content analysis is 0. HOLSTI, CON- 
TENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITES (1969). 
72. United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pal- 
ladino, 475 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1973); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970); 
United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491", 367 F.2d 889 
(2d Cir. 1966); Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966); Star 
v. Preller, 352 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1972); Movies, Inc. v. Conlisk, 345 F. Supp. 780 
(N.D. Ill. 1971); Pandora Books, Inc. v. Gold, 322 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Braha v. 
Texas, 319 F. Supp. 1331 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Goodwin v. Morris, 318 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. 
Ohio 1970); Star-Satellite, Inc. v. Rosetti, 317 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Miss. 1970); United 
States v. Four (4) Books, 289 F. Supp. 972 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Bush v. City of Tuscaloosa, 
50 Ala. App. 44,276 So. 2d 629 (Crim. App. 1973); People v. Burnstad, 32 Cal. App. 3d 
560, 108 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1973); People v. Andrews, 23 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 276 (1972); Kaplan v. United States, 277 A.2d 477 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Collins v. 
State Beverage Dep't, 239 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Fishman v. State, 128 
Ga. App. 505,197 S.E.2d 467 (1973); People v. Nawodylo, 11 Ill. App. 3d 607,297 N.E.2d 
388 (1973); State v. Ramos, 260 Iowa 590, 149 N.W.2d 862 (1967); State v. Henry, 250 
La. 682,198 So. 2d 889 (1967); Dillingham v. State, 9 Md. App. 669,267 A.2d 777 (1970); 
Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320,200 N.W.2d 90 (1972); State 
v. Hoelscher, 294 Minn. 443, 202 N.W.2d 640 (1972); State v. Little Art Corp., 189 Neb. 
681, 204 N.W.2d 574 (1973); Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 
271 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1966); People v. Abronovitz, 62 Misc. 2d 1069, 310 N.Y.S.2d 698 
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Each of the sixty cases was carefully examined for expres- 
sions of criticism or dissatisfaction with the law of obscenity as 
promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court. The results were star- 
tling. In ten of the thirty-two pre-Miller cases, the published 
opinions expressed clear dissatisfaction, and often biting criti- 
cism, of the performance of the Supreme Court in this troubled 
area of the law." In only one post-Miller case-a dissenting 
(Monroe County Ct. 1970); People v. Kirkpatrick, 64 Misc. 2d 1055, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37 
(Crim. Ct. 1970); State v. Valchar, 34 Ohio App. 2d 21, 295 N.E.2d 424 (1973); State v. 
Dornblaser, 26 Ohio Misc. 29, 267 N.E.2d 434 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1971); State v. 
Oregon Bookmark Corp., 7 Or. App. 554, 492 P.2d 504 (1972); State v. Burgin, 255 S.C. 
237, 178 S.E.2d 325 (1970). 
73. United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Palladino, 
490 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 
1973); United Artists Corp. v. Gladwell, 373 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1974); United 
States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380 (C.D. Cal. 1973); McKinney v. State, 52 Ala. App. 615, 
296 So. 2d 235 (Crim. App. 1974); People v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 82,534 P.2d 393, 
120 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1975); Dyke v. State, 232 Ga. 817, 209 S.E.2d 166 (1974); Trotti v. 
State, 144 Ga. App. 648, 242 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Robinson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 37, 237 
S.E.2d 436 (1977); State v. Smalley, 138 Ga. App. 747, 227 S.E.2d 488 (1976); City of 
Belleville v. Morgan, 60 Ill. App. 3d 434, 376 N.E.2d 704 (1978); People v. Tannahill, 38 
Ill. App. 3d 767, 348 N.E.2d 847 (1976); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 
341 So. 2d 23, (La. Ct. App. 1977); Mangum v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 273 Md. 
176,328 A.2d 283 (1974); McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975); State v. Ameri- 
can Theatre Corp., 193 Neb. 289, 227 N.W.2d 390 (1975); People v. Hausman, 82 Misc. 
2d 1032, 372 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975); State v. Bryant, 20 N.C. App. 
223, 201 S.E.2d 211 (1973); State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978); 
Gilbert v. State, 536 P.2d 929 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 
464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975); Soto v. State, 513 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); 
Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 
(Utah 1978); State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977); State v. 
Timmons, 12 Wash. App. 48, 527 P.2d 1399 (1974); Chobot v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 
354, 212 N.W.2d 690 (1973). 
74. In eight of these ten cases, the comment appeared in the opinion of the court. 
See United States v. Palladino, 475 F.2d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. One 
Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "4917', 367 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1966); 
United States v. Four (4) Books, 289 F. Supp. 972,974 (C.D. Cal. 1968); State v. Henry, 
250 La. 682, 702, 198 So. 2d 889, 895 (1967); State v. Hoelscher, 294 Minn. 433, 438-39, 
202 N.W.2d 640, 644 (1972); State v. Little Art Corp., 189 Neb. 681, 683-84, 686, 204 
N.W.2d 574, 576-77, 578 (1973); Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 74, 218 
N.E.2d 668, 670-71, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (1966); People v. Kirkpatrick, 64 Misc. 2d 
1055, 1059, 1061, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37, 42, 45 (Crim. Ct. 1970). It  appeared in a dissent in 
part, Fishman v. State, 128 Ga. App. 505, 197 S.E.2d 467, 474 (1973) (Eberhardt, P.J., 
dissenting in part); and in a concurring opinion, Dillingharn v. State, 9 Md. App. 669, 267 
A.2d 777, 794-95 (1970) (Orth, J., concurring). 
Chi-square was used to measure the statistical significance of the difference between 
the before and after figures, 10 out of 32 versus 1 out of 28. Chi-square (using the Yates 
correction because one of the values is less than 5) was computed a t  7.82, which is signifi- 
cant a t  the .O1 level. That is, such a differential would appear by chance less than one 
time in a hundred. Something happened to make the difference. That "something," in all 
likelihood, was the Miller decision. 
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opinion in a 1975 Missouri decision-was any similar criticism 
found.76 
Selected excerpts from some of the critical pre-Miller opin- 
ions may illustrate how correct Justice Brennan was in describ- 
ing institutional stress, defined in terms of judicial dissatisfac- 
tion with the state of the law in the area of obscenity. 
Responding to the 1966 trial of decisions in Memoirs, Ginzburg 
v. United States,76 and Mishkin v. New York," Judge Moore of 
the Second Circuit gently observed: "Despite the fourteen opin- 
ions in these three cases, the 'fog in which guides and landmarks 
appear only dimly and obscurely from time to time' . . . has not 
lifted appre~iably."~~ Of the same decisions the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California commented: 
"The fact that the Court handed down fourteen different opin- 
ions in three cases on the same day . . . concerning obscenity, 
would indicate that clarity of understanding of the Court's defi- 
nition of obscenity is not exclusively perplexing to me."7s Judge 
Orth of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals was a little more 
blunt: "The opinions of those [and other] cases . . . have left the 
law of obscenity in a deplorable state."s0 Perhaps Judge Tyler of 
the New York City Criminal Court said it best: "There is per- 
haps no area of criminal law in such utter state of confusion and 
frustration as that visited upon the publication and dissemina- 
tion of obscene material. 'Confusion now hath made its master- 
piece.' (Macbeth, Act II).'"' 
75. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d, 343, 349 (Mo. 1975) (Seiler, C.J., dissenting and 
concurring in result). In this opinion, the dissenting judge referred to an earlier (1974) 
Missouri decision, S.S.&W., Inc. v. Kansas City, 515 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. 1974), in which the 
court had spoken of the "uncertainty" created by Supreme Court cases in this area. 
76. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Court affirmed Ginzburg's conviction for sending ob- 
scene materials through the mails, i.e., the magazine EROS, a newsletter Liaison, and a 
book entitled THE HOUSEWIFE'S HANDBOOK ON SELECTIVE PROMISCUITY. The conviction 
was sustained, in part, because the materials were advertised in a way that pandered to 
prurient interests. 
77. 383 U.S. 502 (1966). The Mishkin case involved materials describing sexually 
deviant activities. The Court held that a finding of prurient appeal to the "probable 
recipient" was sufficient, even though the materials might be revolting rather than at- 
tractive to the average person. Id. at  508, 509. 
78. United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491", 367 
F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1966) (citation omitted). 
79. United States v. Four (4) Books, 289 F. Supp. 972, 974 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
80. Dillingham v. State, 9 Md. App. 669, 267 A.2d 777, 794 (1970) (Orth, J., 
concurring). 
81. People v. Kirkpatrick, 64 Misc. 2d 1055, 1059, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37, 42 (Crim. Ct. 
1970). 
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Judging by our sample the number of such commentaries 
was almost nine times greater in the pre-Miller period than in 
the years following that decision. By contrast, two of the twenty- 
eight post-Miller decisions praised Miller for bringing a little or- 
der out of the chaos. Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania hailed Miller as ending "a long period of uncer- 
tainty regarding the constitutional limits of governmental power 
to regulate obscene  material^."^' And the Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals, in an opinion issued shortly after Miller was handed 
down, almost gratefully commented that "our path through the 
judicial thicket of pornographic litigation has been aided greatly 
by this fortuitous event. For the first time in many years, we 
have a rather clear-cut definition of obscenity which commands 
a majority of the United States Supreme Court. . . .''83 Miller 
obviously made a difference in judicial perception of the state of 
the law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Brennan's Paris dissent was based on certain empir- 
ical assumptions about the anticipated impact of the Miller de- 
cision. This Article has attempted to raise doubt about the va- 
lidity of those assumptions. Arguably, at least, producers and 
purveyors of obscene materials have fair notice. Given the com- 
mercial context in which such material is purveyed, and within 
which prosecutions take place, it is reasonable to assume that 
prospective defendants are cognizant of the risk they are taking. 
It is highly probable that many, perhaps most, take a calculated 
risk in getting as close to the line as they can without actually 
inviting prosecution. Admittedly, no one can know with cer- 
tainty the exact point at which the line is crossed, but using the 
Miller definition, a reasonable person can at least know when he 
is getting close. The uncertainty experienced by businessmen in 
this area is surely no greater than that experienced by business- 
men who wish to engage in aggressive practices without crossing 
the point of inviting antitrust prosecution. Certainly Miller pro- 
vides more specificity than previous definitions, and it requires 
that state regulatory statutes also be specific. In this respect the 
Miller definition is demonstrably fairer than its predecessor. 
What does fair notice require? Justice Brennan concluded 
82. Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa 435, 443, 347 A.2d 290, 295 (1975). 
83. Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
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in his Paris dissent that fair notice was not possible with any 
definitional test of obscenity. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for 
the Court, was convinced that the Miller definition would satisfy 
the fair notice requirement. Neither point of view can be readily 
proved or disproved by empirical means. In the author's opinion 
the weight of analogy, logic, and experience since Miller sup- 
ports the Burger position that Miller meets the constitutional 
notice standard. 
Evidence bearing on the remaining two assumptions is less 
arguable. Even if some individuals have felt the chill, the in- 
creasing volume and explicitness of sexually oriented materials 
is powerful evidence that the alleged chilling impact upon soci- 
ety as a whole has been negligible. As for institutional stress, the 
volume of appealed cases and expressed judicial dissatisfaction 
with the law have measurably and markedly decreased since 
Miller. Unless one quarrels with the validity of the indicators, or 
denies the reliability of the sampling process, the empirical evi- 
dence of reduced stress in the system is near to being conclusive. 
Casting doubt upon Justice Brennan's empirical assump- 
tions does not, of course, prove that Miller represents the best 
possible, or even a very good, approach to the regulation of ob- 
scenity. Proponents of a "wide open" approach may contend 
that any amount of chill is too much, or that any prosecution for 
sale to a consenting adult is one too many. Conversely, people 
who see pornography as a threat to society can argue convinc- 
ingly that Miller has not helped much in view of the obvious 
growth of the industry since 1973. Whatever is done, however, it 
ought not be done under a misapprehension of Miller's impact 
on society. Certainly those who would abandon all restrictions 
on distribution of obscene materials to willing adults should se- 
riously reconsider whether the lack of fair notice, the chill on 
protected expression, and institutional stress are empirically 
sound reasons for doing so. 
